



DRONACHARYA
College of Engineering

INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS (CSE-303-F)

Section B

Dealing with Uncertainty

Introduction

- The world is not a well-defined place.
- There is uncertainty in the facts we know:
 - What's the temperature? Imprecise measures
 - Is Bush a good president? Imprecise definitions
 - Where is the pit? Imprecise knowledge
- There is uncertainty in our inferences
 - If I have a blistery, itchy rash and was gardening all weekend I probably have poison ivy
- People make successful decisions all the time anyhow.

Sources of Uncertainty

- Uncertain data
 - missing data, unreliable, ambiguous, imprecise representation, inconsistent, subjective, derived from defaults, noisy...
- Uncertain knowledge
 - Multiple causes lead to multiple effects
 - Incomplete knowledge of causality in the domain
 - Probabilistic/stochastic effects
- Uncertain knowledge representation
 - restricted model of the real system
 - limited expressiveness of the representation mechanism
- inference process
 - Derived result is formally correct, but wrong in the real world
 - New conclusions are not well-founded (eg, inductive reasoning)
 - Incomplete, default reasoning methods

Reasoning Under Uncertainty

- So how do we do reasoning under uncertainty and with inexact knowledge?
 - heuristics
 - ways to mimic heuristic knowledge processing methods used by experts
 - empirical associations
 - experiential reasoning
 - based on limited observations
 - probabilities
 - objective (frequency counting)
 - subjective (human experience)

Decision making with uncertainty

□ Rational behavior:

- For each possible action, identify the possible outcomes
- Compute the **probability** of each outcome
- Compute the **utility** of each outcome
- Compute the probability-weighted (**expected**) **utility** over possible outcomes for each action
- Select the action with the highest expected utility (principle of **Maximum Expected Utility**)

Some Relevant Factors

- expressiveness
 - can concepts used by humans be represented adequately?
 - can the confidence of experts in their decisions be expressed?
- comprehensibility
 - representation of uncertainty
 - utilization in reasoning methods
- correctness
 - probabilities
 - relevance ranking
 - long inference chains
- computational complexity
 - feasibility of calculations for practical purposes
- reproducibility
 - will observations deliver the same results when repeated?

Basics of Probability Theory

- mathematical approach for processing uncertain information
 - sample space set
 $X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$
 - collection of all possible events
 - can be discrete or continuous
 - probability number $P(x_i)$: likelihood of an event x_i to occur
 - non-negative value in $[0,1]$
 - total probability of the sample space is 1
 - for mutually exclusive events, the probability for at least one of them is the sum of their individual probabilities
 - *experimental probability*
 - based on the frequency of events
 - *subjective probability*
 - based on expert assessment

Compound Probabilities

- describes *independent* events
 - do not affect each other in any way
- *joint* probability of two independent events A and B
$$P(A \cap B) = P(A) * P(B)$$
- *union* probability of two independent events A and B
$$P(A \cup B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \cap B)$$
$$= P(A) + P(B) - P(A) * P(B)$$

Probability theory

- **Random variables**

- Domain

- **Atomic event**: complete specification of state

- **Prior probability**: degree of belief without any other evidence

- **Joint probability**: matrix of combined probabilities of a set of variables

- Alarm, Burglary, Earthquake

- Boolean (like these), discrete, continuous

- $\text{Alarm}=\text{True} \wedge \text{Burglary}=\text{True} \wedge \text{Earthquake}=\text{False}$
 $\text{alarm} \wedge \text{burglary} \wedge \text{earthquake}$

- $P(\text{Burglary}) = .1$

- $P(\text{Alarm, Burglary}) =$

| | alarm | \neg alarm |
|-----------------|-------|--------------|
| burglary | .09 | .01 |
| \neg burglary | .1 | .8 |

Probability theory (cont.)

- **Conditional probability:**
probability of effect given causes
- **Computing conditional probs:**
 - $P(a \mid b) = P(a \wedge b) / P(b)$
 - $P(b)$: **normalizing** constant
- **Product rule:**
 - $P(a \wedge b) = P(a \mid b) P(b)$
- **Marginalizing:**
 - $P(B) = \sum_a P(B, a)$
 - $P(B) = \sum_a P(B \mid a) P(a)$
(**conditioning**)
- $P(\text{burglary} \mid \text{alarm}) = .47$
 $P(\text{alarm} \mid \text{burglary}) = .9$
- $P(\text{burglary} \mid \text{alarm}) =$
 $P(\text{burglary} \wedge \text{alarm}) / P(\text{alarm})$
 $= .09 / .19 = .47$
- $P(\text{burglary} \wedge \text{alarm}) =$
 $P(\text{burglary} \mid \text{alarm}) P(\text{alarm}) =$
 $.47 * .19 = .09$
- $P(\text{alarm}) =$
 $P(\text{alarm} \wedge \text{burglary}) +$
 $P(\text{alarm} \wedge \neg \text{burglary}) =$
 $.09 + .1 = .19$

Independence

- When two sets of propositions do not affect each others' probabilities, we call them **independent**, and can easily compute their joint and conditional probability:
 - Independent (A, B) if $P(A \wedge B) = P(A) P(B)$, $P(A | B) = P(A)$
- For example, {moon-phase, light-level} might be independent of {burglary, alarm, earthquake}
 - Then again, it might not: Burglars might be more likely to burglarize houses when there's a new moon (and hence little light)
 - But if we know the light level, the moon phase doesn't affect whether we are burglarized
 - Once we're burglarized, light level doesn't affect whether the alarm goes off
- We need a more complex notion of independence, and methods for reasoning about these kinds of relationships

Exercise: Independence

| $p(\text{smart} \wedge \text{study} \wedge \text{prep})$ | smart | | $\neg \text{smart}$ | |
|--|-------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | study | $\neg \text{study}$ | study | $\neg \text{study}$ |
| prepared | .432 | .16 | .084 | .008 |
| $\neg \text{prepared}$ | .048 | .16 | .036 | .072 |

□ Queries:

- Is *smart* independent of *study*?
- Is *prepared* independent of *study*?

Conditional independence

- Absolute independence:

- A and B are **independent** if $P(A \wedge B) = P(A) P(B)$;
equivalently, $P(A) = P(A | B)$ and $P(B) = P(B | A)$

- A and B are **conditionally independent** given C if

- $P(A \wedge B | C) = P(A | C) P(B | C)$

- This lets us decompose the joint distribution:

- $P(A \wedge B \wedge C) = P(A | C) P(B | C) P(C)$

- Moon-Phase and Burglary are ***conditionally independent given*** Light-Level

- Conditional independence is weaker than absolute independence, but still useful in decomposing the full joint probability distribution

Exercise: Conditional independence

| $p(\text{smart} \wedge \text{study} \wedge \text{prep})$ | smart | | $\neg\text{smart}$ | |
|--|-------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | study | $\neg\text{study}$ | study | $\neg\text{study}$ |
| prepared | .432 | .16 | .084 | .008 |
| $\neg\text{prepared}$ | .048 | .16 | .036 | .072 |

□ Queries:

- Is *smart* conditionally independent of *prepared*, given *study*?
- Is *study* conditionally independent of *prepared*, given *smart*?

Conditional Probabilities

- describes *dependent* events
 - affect each other in some way
- *conditional probability* of event a given that event B has already occurred
$$P(A|B) = P(A \cap B) / P(B)$$

Bayesian Approaches

- derive the probability of an event given another event
- Often useful for diagnosis:
 - If X are (observed) effects and Y are (hidden) causes,
 - We may have a model for how causes lead to effects ($P(X | Y)$)
 - We may also have prior beliefs (based on experience) about the frequency of occurrence of effects ($P(Y)$)
 - Which allows us to reason abductively from effects to causes ($P(Y | X)$).
- has gained importance recently due to advances in efficiency
 - more computational power available
 - better methods

Bayes' Rule for Single Event

- single hypothesis H , single event E

$$P(H|E) = (P(E|H) * P(H)) / P(E)$$

or

- $$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H) * P(H)}{(P(E|H) * P(H) + P(E|\neg H) * P(\neg H))}$$

Bayes Example: Diagnosing Meningitis

□ Suppose we know that

- Stiff neck is a symptom in 50% of meningitis cases
- Meningitis (m) occurs in 1/50,000 patients
- Stiff neck (s) occurs in 1/20 patients

□ Then

- $P(s|m) = 0.5$, $P(m) = 1/50000$, $P(s) = 1/20$
- $P(m|s) = (P(s|m) P(m))/P(s)$
 $= (0.5 \times 1/50000) / 1/20 = .0002$

□ So we expect that one in 5000 patients with a stiff neck to have meningitis.

Advantages and Problems Of Bayesian Reasoning

□ advantages

- sound theoretical foundation
- well-defined semantics for decision making

□ problems

- requires large amounts of probability data
 - sufficient sample sizes
- subjective evidence may not be reliable
- independence of evidences assumption often not valid
- relationship between hypothesis and evidence is reduced to a number
- explanations for the user difficult
- high computational overhead

Some Issues with Probabilities

- Often don't have the data
 - Just don't have enough observations
 - Data can't readily be reduced to numbers or frequencies.
- Human estimates of probabilities are notoriously inaccurate. In particular, often add up to >1 .
- Doesn't always match human reasoning well.
 - $P(x) = 1 - P(-x)$. Having a stiff neck is strong (.9998!) evidence that you don't have meningitis. True, but counterintuitive.
- Several other approaches for uncertainty address some of these problems.

Dempster-Shafer Theory

- mathematical theory of evidence

- Notations


- Environment T : set of objects that are of interest
- *frame of discernment* FD
 - power set of the set of possible elements
- mass probability function m
 - assigns a value from $[0,1]$ to every item in the frame of discernment
- *mass probability* $m(A)$
 - portion of the total mass probability that is assigned to an element A of FD

D-S Underlying concept

- The most basic problem with uncertainty is often with the axiom that $P(X) + P(\text{not } X) = 1$
 - If the probability that you have poison ivy when you have a rash is .3, this means that a rash is strongly suggestive (.7) that you don't have poison ivy.
 - True, in a sense, but neither intuitive nor helpful.
- What you really mean is that the probability is .3 that you have poison ivy and .7 that we *don't know yet* what you have.
- So we initially assign all of the probability to the total set of things you *might* have: the frame of discernment.

Example: Frame of Discernment


Environment: Mentally retarded (MR), Learning disabled (LD), Not Eligible (NE)



Example: We don't know anything

Frame of Discernment:


Mentally retarded (MR), Learning disabled (LD), Not Eligible (NE)



Example: We believe MR at 0.8

Frame of Discernment:


Mentally retarded (MR), Learning disabled (LD), Not Eligible (NE)



Example: We believe NOT MR at 0.7

Frame of Discernment:

Mentally retarded (MR), Learning disabled (LD), Not Eligible (NE)



Belief and Certainty


- belief $\text{Bel}(A)$ in a subset A
 - sum of the mass probabilities of all the proper subsets of A
 - likelihood that one of its members is the conclusion
- plausibility $\text{Pls}(A)$
 - maximum belief of A , upper bound
 - $1 - \text{Bel}(\text{not } A)$
- certainty $\text{Cer}(A)$
 - interval $[\text{Bel}(A), \text{Pls}(A)]$
 - expresses the range of belief

Example: Bel, Pls

Frame of Discernment:

Mentally retarded (MR), Learning disabled (LD), Not Eligible (NE)

$\{MR, LD, NE\}$ $m=0$, $Bel=1$



Interpretation: Some Evidential Intervals

- Completely true: $[1,1]$
- Completely false: $[0,0]$
- Completely ignorant: $[0,1]$
- Doubt -- disbelief in X: $\text{Dbt} = \text{Bel}(\text{not } X)$
- Ignorance -- range of uncertainty: $\text{Igr} = \text{Pls} - \text{Bel}$
- Tends to support: $[\text{Bel}, 1]$ ($0 < \text{Bel} < 1$)
- Tends to refute: $[0, \text{Pls}]$ ($0 < \text{Pls} < 1$)
- Tends to both support and refute: $[\text{Bel}, \text{Pls}]$ ($0 < \text{Bel} < \text{Pls} < 1$)

Advantages and Problems of Dempster-Shafer

□ advantages

- clear, rigorous foundation
- ability to express confidence through intervals
 - certainty about certainty

□ problems

- non-intuitive determination of mass probability
- very high computational overhead
- may produce counterintuitive results due to normalization when probabilities are combined
- Still hard to get numbers

Certainty Factors

- shares some foundations with Dempster-Shafer theory, but more practical
- denotes the belief in a hypothesis H given that some pieces of evidence are observed
- *no statements* about the belief is *no evidence is present*
 - in contrast to Bayes' method

Belief and Disbelief

□ measure of belief

- degree to which hypothesis H is supported by evidence E
- $MB(H,E) = 1$ IF $P(H) = 1$
 $(P(H|E) - P(H)) / (1 - P(H))$ otherwise

□ measure of disbelief

- degree to which doubt in hypothesis H is supported by evidence E
- $MB(H,E) = 1$ IF $P(H) = 0$
 $(P(H) - P(H|E)) / P(H)$ otherwise

Certainty Factor

□ certainty factor CF

- ranges between -1 (denial of the hypothesis H) and 1 (confirmation of H)

□ $CF = (MB - MD) / (1 - \min(MD, MB))$

□ combining antecedent evidence

- use of premises with less than absolute confidence
 - $E1 \wedge E2 = \min(CF(H, E1), CF(H, E2))$
 - $E1 \vee E2 = \max(CF(H, E1), CF(H, E2))$
 - $\neg E = \neg CF(H, E)$

Combining Certainty Factors

- certainty factors that support the same conclusion
- several rules can lead to the same conclusion
- applied incrementally as new evidence becomes available

- $C_{frev}(CF_{old}, CF_{new}) =$
 - $CF_{old} + CF_{new}(1 - CF_{old})$ if both > 0
 - $CF_{old} + CF_{new}(1 + CF_{old})$ if both < 0
 - $CF_{old} + CF_{new} / (1 - \min(|CF_{old}|, |CF_{new}|))$ if one < 0

Advantages of Certainty Factors

□ Advantages

- simple implementation
- reasonable modeling of human experts' belief
 - expression of belief and disbelief
- successful applications for certain problem classes
- evidence relatively easy to gather
 - no statistical base required

Problems of Certainty Factors

□ Problems

- partially ad hoc approach
 - theoretical foundation through Dempster-Shafer theory was developed later
- combination of non-independent evidence unsatisfactory
- new knowledge may require changes in the certainty factors of existing knowledge
- certainty factors can become the opposite of conditional probabilities for certain cases
- not suitable for long inference chains


Fuzzy Logic

- approach to a formal treatment of uncertainty
- relies on quantifying and reasoning through natural (or at least non-mathematical) language
- Rejects the underlying concept of an excluded middle: things have a degree of membership in a concept or set
 - Are you tall?
 - Are you rich?
- As long as we have a way to formally describe degree of membership and a way to combine degrees of memberships, we can reason.

Fuzzy Set

- categorization of elements x_i into a set S
 - described through a membership function $m(s)$
 - associates each element x_i with a degree of membership in S
- possibility measure $\text{Poss}\{x \in S\}$
 - degree to which an individual element x is a potential member in the fuzzy set S
 - combination of multiple premises
 - $\text{Poss}(A \wedge B) = \min(\text{Poss}(A), \text{Poss}(B))$
 - $\text{Poss}(A \vee B) = \max(\text{Poss}(A), \text{Poss}(B))$

Fuzzy Set Example



Fuzzy vs. Crisp Set



Fuzzy Reasoning

- In order to implement a fuzzy reasoning system you need
 - For each variable, a defined set of values for membership
 - Can be numeric (1 to 10)
 - Can be linguistic
 - really no, no, maybe, yes, really yes
 - tiny, small, medium, large, gigantic
 - good, okay, bad
 - And you need a set of rules for combining them
 - Good and bad = okay.

Fuzzy Inference Methods

- Lots of ways to combine evidence across rules
 - $\text{Poss}(B|A) = \min(1, (1 - \text{Poss}(A) + \text{Poss}(B)))$
 - implication according to Max-Min inference
 - also Max-Product inference and other rules
 - formal foundation through Lukasiewicz logic
 - extension of binary logic to infinite-valued logic
- Can be enumerated or calculated.

Some Additional Fuzzy Concepts

- Support set: all elements with membership > 0
- Alpha-cut set: all elements with membership greater than alpha
- Height: maximum grade of membership
- Normalized: height = 1

Some typical domains

- Control (subways, camera focus)
- Pattern Recognition (OCR, video stabilization)
- Inference (diagnosis, planning, NLP)

Advantages and Problems of Fuzzy Logic

□ advantages

- general theory of uncertainty
- wide applicability, many practical applications
- natural use of vague and imprecise concepts
 - helpful for commonsense reasoning, explanation

□ problems

- membership functions can be difficult to find
- multiple ways for combining evidence
- problems with long inference chains

Uncertainty: Conclusions

- ❑ In AI we must often represent and reason about uncertain information
- ❑ This is no different from what people do all the time!
- ❑ There are multiple approaches to handling uncertainty.
- ❑ Probabilistic methods are most rigorous but often hard to apply; Bayesian reasoning and Dempster-Shafer extend it to handle problems of independence and ignorance of data
- ❑ Fuzzy logic provides an alternate approach which better supports ill-defined or non-numeric domains.
- ❑ Empirically, it is often the case that the main need is some way of expressing "maybe". Any system which provides for at least a three-valued logic tends to yield the same decisions.